What is that which is Existent always and has no Becoming ? And what is that which is Becoming always and never is Existent ? Now the one of these is apprehensible by thought with the aid of reasoning , since it is ever uniformly existent ; whereas the other is an object of opinion with the aid of unreasoning sensation , since it becomes and perishes and is never really existent . Again , everything which becomes must of necessity become owing to some Cause ; for without a cause it is impossible for anything to attain becoming . But when the artificer of any object , in forming its shape and quality , keeps his gaze fixed on that which is uniform , using a model of this kind , that object , executed in this way , must of necessity be beautiful ; but whenever he gazes at that which has come into existence and uses a created model , the object thus executed is not beautiful . Now the whole Heaven , or Cosmos , or if there is any other name which it specially prefers , by that let us call it , —so , be its name what it may , we must first investigate concerning it that primary question which has to be investigated at the outset in every case , —namely , whether it has existed always , having no beginning of generation , or whether it has come into existence , having begun from some beginning . It has come into existence ; for it is visible and tangible and possessed of a body ; and all such things are sensible , and things sensible , being apprehensible by opinion with the aid of sensation , come into existence , as we saw , 1 and are generated . And that which has come into existence must necessarily , as we say , have come into existence by reason of some Cause . Now to discover the Maker and Father of this Universe were a task indeed ; and having discovered Him , to declare Him unto all men were a thing impossible . However , let us return and inquire further concerning the Cosmos , —after which of the Models did its Architect construct it ? Was it after that which is self-identical and uniform , or after that which has come into existence ; Now if so be that this Cosmos is beautiful and its Constructor good , it is plain that he fixed his gaze on the Eternal ; but if otherwise ( which is an impious supposition ) , his gaze was on that which has come into existence . But it is clear to everyone that his gaze was on the Eternal ; for the Cosmos is the fairest of all that has come into existence , and He the best of all the Causes . So having in this wise come into existence , it has been constructed after the pattern of that which is apprehensible by reason and thought and is self-identical . Again , if these premisses be granted , it is wholly necessary that this Cosmos should be a Copy of something . Now in regard to every matter it is most important to begin at the natural beginning . Accordingly , in dealing with a copy and its model , we must affirm that the accounts given will themselves be akin to the diverse objects which they serve to explain ; those which deal with what is abiding and firm and discernible by the aid of thought will be abiding and unshakable ; and in so far as it is possible and fitting for statements to be irrefutable and invincible , they must in no wise fall short thereof ; whereas the accounts of that which is copied after the likeness of that Model , and is itself a likeness , will be analogous thereto and possess likelihood ; for I as Being is to Becoming , so is Truth to Belief . Wherefore , Socrates , if in our treatment of a great host of matters regarding the Gods and the generation of the Universe we prove unable to give accounts that are always in all respects self-consistent and perfectly exact , be not thou surprised ; rather we should be content if we can furnish accounts that are inferior to none in likelihood , remembering that both I who speak and you who judge are but human creatures , so that it becomes us to accept the likely account of these matters and forbear to search beyond it .

Socrates
Excellent , Timaeus ! We must by all means accept it , as you suggest ; and certainly we have most cordially accepted your prelude ; so now , we beg of you , proceed straight on with the main theme .

Timaeus
Let us now state the Cause wherefore He that constructed it constructed Becoming and the All . He was good , and in him that is good no envy ariseth ever concerning anything ; and being devoid of envy He desired that all should be , so far as possible , like unto Himself . This principle , then , we shall be wholly right in accepting from men of wisdom as being above all the supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos . For God desired that , so far as possible , all things should be good and nothing evil ;

τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί , γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον , καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί , ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε ; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν , ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν , τὸ δ᾽ αὖ δόξῃ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν , γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον , ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν . πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ᾽ αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι : παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν . ὅτου μὲν οὖν ἂν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί , τοιούτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι , τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζηται , καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι πᾶν : οὗ δ᾽ ἂν εἰς γεγονός , γεννητῷ παραδείγματι προσχρώμενος , οὐ καλόν . ὁ δὴ πᾶς οὐρανὸς —ἢ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι ποτὲ ὀνομαζόμενος μάλιστ᾽ ἂν δέχοιτο , τοῦθ᾽ ἡμῖν ὠνομάσθω—σκεπτέον δ᾽ οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον , ὅπερ ὑπόκειται περὶ παντὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ δεῖν σκοπεῖν , πότερον ἦν ἀεί , γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν , ἢ γέγονεν , ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος . γέγονεν : ὁρατὸς γὰρ ἁπτός τέ ἐστιν καὶ σῶμα ἔχων , πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰσθητά , τὰ δ᾽ αἰσθητά , δόξῃ περιληπτὰ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως , γιγνόμενα καὶ γεννητὰ ἐφάνη . τῷ δ᾽ αὖ γενομένῳ φαμὲν ὑπ᾽ αἰτίου τινὸς ἀνάγκην εἶναι γενέσθαι . τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν : τόδε δ᾽ οὖν πάλιν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ αὐτοῦ , πρὸς πότερον τῶν παραδειγμάτων ὁ τεκταινόμενος αὐτὸν ἀπηργάζετο , πότερον πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἢ πρὸς τὸ γεγονός . εἰ μὲν δὴ καλός ἐστιν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ὅ τε δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός , δῆλον ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον ἔβλεπεν : εἰ δὲ ὃ μηδ᾽ εἰπεῖν τινι θέμις , πρὸς γεγονός . παντὶ δὴ σαφὲς ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον : ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων , ὁ δ᾽ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων . οὕτω δὴ γεγενημένος πρὸς τὸ λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτὸν καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον δεδημιούργηται τούτων δὲ ὑπαρχόντων αὖ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι . μέγιστον δὴ παντὸς ἄρξασθαι κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχήν . ὧδε οὖν περί τε εἰκόνος καὶ περὶ τοῦ παραδείγματος αὐτῆς διοριστέον , ὡς ἄρα τοὺς λόγους , ὧνπέρ εἰσιν ἐξηγηταί , τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ συγγενεῖς ὄντας : τοῦ μὲν οὖν μονίμου καὶ βεβαίου καὶ μετὰ νοῦ καταφανοῦς μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους—καθ᾽ ὅσον οἷόν τε καὶ ἀνελέγκτοις προσήκει λόγοις εἶναι καὶ ἀνικήτοις , τούτου δεῖ μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν—τοὺς δὲ τοῦ πρὸς μὲν ἐκεῖνο ἀπεικασθέντος , ὄντος δὲ εἰκόνος εἰκότας ἀνὰ λόγον τε ἐκείνων ὄντας : ὅτιπερ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία , τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια . ἐὰν οὖν , ὦ Σώκρατες , πολλὰ πολλῶν πέρι , θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως , μὴ δυνατοὶ γιγνώμεθα πάντῃ πάντως αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ὁμολογουμένους λόγους καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένους ἀποδοῦναι , μὴ θαυμάσῃς : ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἄρα μηδενὸς ἧττον παρεχώμεθα εἰκότας , ἀγαπᾶν χρή , μεμνημένους ὡς ὁ λέγων ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς τε οἱ κριταὶ φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν , ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τούτου μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ζητεῖν .

Σωκράτης
ἄριστα , ὦ Τίμαιε , παντάπασί τε ὡς κελεύεις ἀποδεκτέον : τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου , τὸν δὲ δὴ νόμον ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς πέραινε .

Τίμαιος
λέγωμεν δὴ δι᾽ ἥντινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν . ἀγαθὸς ἦν , ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος : τούτου δ᾽ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ . ταύτην δὴ γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου μάλιστ᾽ ἄν τις ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην παρ᾽ ἀνδρῶν φρονίμων ἀποδεχόμενος ὀρθότατα ἀποδέχοιτ᾽ ἄν .

Quid est , quod semper sit neque ullum habeat ortum , et quod gignatur nec umquam sit ? Quorum alterum intellegentia et ratione conprehenditur , quod unum atque idem semper est ; alterum , quod ad- fert opinionem sensus rationis expers , quod totum opinabile est , id gignitur et interit nec umquam esse vere potest . Omne autem , quod gignitur , ex aliqua causa gigni necesse est ; nullius enim rei causa remota reperiri origo potest . Quocirca si is , qui aliquod munus efficere molitur , eam speciem , quae semper eadem est , intuebitur atque id sibi proponet exemplar , praeclarum opus efficiat necesse est ; sin autem eam , quae gigni- tur , numquam illam , quam expetet , pulchritudinem consequetur . Omne igitur caelum sive mundus , sive quo alio vocabulo gaudet , hoc a nobis nuncupatus sit—de quo id primum consideremus , quod prin- cipio est in omni quaestione considerandum , sem- perne fuerit nullo generatus ortu , an ortus sit ab aliquo temporis principatu . Ortus est , quandoquidem cernitur et tangitur et est undique corporatus . Omnia autem talia sensum movent , sensusque moventia quae sunt , eadem in opinatione considunt ; quae ortum habere gignique diximus , nihil autem gigni posse sine causis . Atque illum quidem quasi parentem huius universitatis invenire difficile et , cum iam inveneris , indicare in vulgus nefas . Rursus igitur videndum , ille fabricator huius tanti operis utrum sit imitatus exemplar , idne , quod semper unum et idem et sui simile , an id , quod generatum ortumque dicimus . Atqui si pulcher est hic mundus et si probus eius artifex , profecto speciem aeternitatis imitari maluit , sin secus , quod ne dictu quidem fas est , generatum exemplum est pro aeterno secutus . Non igitur dubium , quin aeternitatem ma- luerit exsequi , quandoquidem neque mundo quicquam pulchrius neque eius aedificatore praestantius . Sic ergo generatus ad id est effectus , quod ratione sapientiaque conprehenditur atque aeternitate inmutabili continetur . Ex quo efficitur , ut sit necesse hunc , quem cernimus , mundum simulacrum aeternum esse alicuius aeterni . Difficillimum autem est in omni conquisitione ra- tionis exordium . De iis igitur , quae diximus , haec sit prima distinctio . Omni orationi cum iis rebus , de quibus explicat , videtur esse cognatio . Itaque cum de re stabili et inmutabili disputat oratio , talis sit , qualis illa , quae neque redargui neque convinci potest . Cum autem ingressa est imitata et efficta simulacra , bene agi putat , si similitudinem veri consequatur . Quantum enim ad id , quod ortum est , aeternitas valet , tantum ad fidem veritas . Quocirca si forte de deorum na- tura ortuque mundi disserentes minus id , quod ave- mus animo , consequemur , ut tota dilucide et plane ex- ornata oratio sibi constet et ex omni parte secum ipsa consentiat , haut sane erit mirum , contentique esse debe- bitis , si probabilia dicentur . Aequum est enim memi- nisse et me , qui disseram , hominem esse et vos , qui iudi- cetis , ut , si probabilia dicentur , ne quid ultra requiratis . Quaeramus igitur causam , quae inpulerit eum , qui haec machinatus sit , ut originem rerum et molitionem novam quaereret . Probitate videlicet praestabat ; pro- bus autem invidet nemini ; itaque omnia sui similia generavit . Haec nimirum gignendi mundi causa iustis- sima .